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of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and of the conditions prompting its adoption,22
lends support to the current view that Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion is but
an anomalous attempt to whitewash all union undertakings as long as they are
conducted in a gentlemanly fashion.23 It is, therefore, possible that the Court
will ultimately treat this opinion as mere dictum and adopt Mr. Chief Justice
Stone's concurring opinion as the proper rationale.24 If the Chief Justice could
then be prevailed upon to put his "substantiality" test to work, the Court
could, without loss of face, decide against the union in the newly-brought case
we have been considering.25
SECRET LIENS AND THE CHANDLER ACT
Decisions interpreting the preference provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of
i898 reveal the presence of two conflicting policies;' Congress and the Supreme
Court appear to have chosen opposite sides in the controversy between the gen-
eral creditors and particular creditors who claim the benefit of secret liens.
Behind legal phraseology is concealed a balancing of the important economic
interests. Interpretations by the Court of successive amendments to Section 602
22 The desire for procedural reform to curb the use of injunctions appears to have been the
sole motive behind the statute. Both foes and supporters of the bill agreed that it was not in
any way meant to widen civil and criminal immunities. 75 Cong. Rec. 5462 et seq. (1932).
Mr. Justice, then Professor, Frankfurter himself asserted then that the Act "explicitly applies
only to the authority of United States courts 'to issue any restraining order or injunction.'
All other remedies in federal courts and all remedies in state courts remain available." Frank-
furter and Greene, The Labor Injunction 220 (I930).
23Steffen, Labor Activities in Restraint of Trade: The Hutcheson Case, 36 Ill. L. Rev. i
(1941); Gregory, The New Sherman-Clayton-Norris-LaGuardia Act, 8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 503
(1941); see Landis, The Apex Case--Addendum, 26 Cornell L. Q. 212A (I941).
24This is a very real possibility in view of the somewhat analogous manner in which the
doctrine of picketing as free speech enunciated in Thornhill v. Alabama, 3o U.S. 88 (i94o),
has been drastically limited by the case of Carpenter and Joiners Union of America, Local No.
213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 35 U.S. 722 (1942). But the prompt affirmance of the Hutcheson case in
three cases indicates that perhaps the time for overhauling has not yet arrived. United States
v. Building and Construction Trades Council of New Orleans, 4 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5,118
(1941), aff'd 313 U.S. 539 (1941); United States v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, 4 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5,ii8 (1941), aff'd 313 U.S. 539 (194i); United
States v. Carrazzo, 37 F. Supp. 191 (Ill. 1941), aff'd sub nom. Int'l Hod Carriers' and Com-
mon Laborers' District Council of Chicago, 313 U.S. 539 (x94I).
2
s It should be noted that most of the theatres are already organized by a rival union; but
this cannot be expected to influence the decision, since a jurisdictional dispute has already
been presented to the Court in the Hutcheson case and appeared to disturb none of the judges.
See Gregory, Union Peacetime Restraints in Collective Bargaining, io Univ. Chi. L. Rev. r88
ff. (1943), for proposed legislative solutions to the growing problem of internecine conflict.
x Britton, EquitableLiens-A Tentative Analysis of the Problem, 8 N.C.L. Rev. 388 (1930);
Validity of Liens Against a Trustee in Bankruptcy, 34 Yale L.J. 891 (X925); Voidability in
Bankruptcy of Transfers Recorded within the Four Months Period, 44 Yale L.J. iog (1934).
2 Chandier Act § 6o(a), 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 96(a) (Supp. 1942): "A
preference is a transfer, as defined in this Act, of any of the property of a debtor to or for
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have repeatedly frustrated what authorities believe was Congressional intent.3
The extraordinary role which bankruptcy plays in a competitive structure built
around traditional property rights makes the divergence of view understand-
able. In the interest of equal distribution of the assets of the bankrupt, legisla-
tive regulation halts the race of the diligent to secure priority through common
law title concepts. 4 The common law retreats reluctantly and cautiously, and,
though we are able quite dearly to see major policy outlines, comparatively
minor variations in the facts give rise to serious difficulties.
That the Chandler Act has changed the law of preferences is conceded. The
precise nature of the change is in dispute. Typical situations will illustrate the
areas of certainty and uncertainty. A creditor of the bankrupt claims status as
a secured creditor because of a mortgage obtained by him to secure a then-
existing debt. The mortgage was later recorded within four months of bank-
ruptcy. Before the Chandler Act, it was held that this did not constitute a
voidable preference.5 Under the Chandler Act, the transfer is "deemed to have
been made at the time when it became so far perfected that no bona-fide pur-
chaser from the debtor and no creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights
in the property so transferred superior .... "6 to those of the mortgagee. Since
the original mortgage was clearly a transfer "for or on account of an antecedent
debt," it is a preference if the other elements are present. This interpretation is
clearly sound and is illustrated by a recent decision.7 In this case, to secure a
then-existing debt, a creditor obtained and recorded a mortgage with an after-
acquired property clause. The mortgage was executed and recorded ten months
before bankruptcy. Within four months of the filing of the petition, and at a
time when the debtor was insolvent, the mortgagee took possession of after-
acquired property. The court found that under the law of the state until the
the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such
debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or against him of the peti-
tion in bankruptcy .... the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain
a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class. For the purpose of
subdivisions a and b of this section, a transfer shall be deemed to have been made at the time
when it became so far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser from the debtor and no creditors
could thereafter have acquired any rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights
of the transferee therein, and, if such transfer is not so far perfected prior to the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy .... it shall be deemed to have been made immediately before
bankruptcy."
3 McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 369, 388-95 (I937); McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 Harv. L. Rev.
341, 374-91 (1927); Mulder, Ambiguities in the Chandler Act, 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 10, 22-26
(i94o); 3 Collier, Bankruptcy 6o.o5-.o6 (i4th ed. 1941).
4 For the general theories underlying preferences in bankruptcy, see 3 Collier, Bankruptcy
6o.oi (W4th ed. 1941).
5 Carey v. Donohue, 240 U.S. 430 (1916).
6 Chandler Act § 6o(a), 52 Stat. 869 (1938), ii U.S.C.A. § 96(a) (Supp. 1942).
In re Markert, 45 F. Supp. 66i (Mass. 1942).
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mortgagee took possession, a bona fide purchaser or an attaching creditor could
have acquired rights in the property superior to those of the mortgagee. Until
possession was obtained, the security was not "so far perfected" and therefore
the transfer, within the meaning of the Act, occurred when possession was
taken. Since this was within four months of the filing of the petition and since
the mortgage was given to secure an antecedent debt, the transfer constituted a
preference. If the mortgagee had never obtained possession, or, in the case of an
unrecorded mortgage, had not recorded at all, the transfer, not having been
perfected prior to the petition, would be "deemed to have been made immedi-
ately before bankruptcy," and, the other elements being present, would be a
preference. This interpretation appears to be well established.8
Despite its general objective of equality among creditors, the Bankruptcy
Act protects the claims of those who by their diligence have promptly secured
their claims by legally recognized liens good not only between the parties but
against the world at large. But fairness to unsecured creditors who may have
loaned or given forbearance in reliance on the debtor's appearance of prosperity
requires that lienors give adequate notice of their claims in a recognized manner,
such as recording or taking possession. Moreover, the Act prevents the deple-
tion of the bankrupt's estate by "diligent" creditors within the four months
period, if such depletion occurs while the debtor is insolvent and the creditors
know of the insolvency.9 The policy against disappointing reasonable expecta-
tions is incorporated into the Act through reference to the state laws; equality is
promoted by setting aside preferences made within the four months' period.
A small change in the situation first discussed may lead to a strikingly dif-
ferent result. If a mortgage is executed more than four months before bank-
ruptcy to secure a debt which is created simultaneously and later the mortgage
is recorded within the four months period, a court may hold that there is no
preference. This was true before the Chandler Act.' 0 Similarly, if the bankrupt
gives the claimant a bill of sale conveying property to secure a debt created
simultaneously, and it is subsequently recorded within four months of filing of
the petition, it has been held in Adams v. City Bank & Trust Co. of Macon, Ga.-
that this is no preference under the Chandler Act, because it is not a transfer
made "for or on account of an antecedent debt." It is said that here is no
diminution of the estate, since the original unperfected conveyance was made
for adequate present consideration.
8 In re Talbot Canning Corp., 35 F. Supp. 68o (Md. 194o), noted in 4o Mich. L. Rev. xo5
(i94i), remanded for further findings of fact, In re Talbot Canning Corp., 39 F. Supp. 858
(Md. 1941), rev'd on the other findings of fact sub nom. Associated Seed Growers v. Geib,
125 F. (2d) 683 (C.C.A. 4th 1942); In re Seim Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 855 (Md. r941).
9 Equitable Liens and Pledges: A Study in Security and Bankruptcy Law, 37 Col. L. Rev.621, 627 (1937); 41 Col.L. Rev. 512, 5 15 (1941).
10 Martin v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 245 U.S. 5x3 (19'8).
11 115 F. (2d) 453 (C.C.A. 5th I94O), cert. den. 312 U.S. 699 (194).
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This point of view has been adversely criticized.12 If one considers only the
four months period, the bankrupt's estate is diminished if the mortgage is per-
fected by the tardy recording. There is no less a diminution than when the
security was, given for a pre-existing debt. The same kind of reliance, or danger
of reliance, is present, and expectations may be equally frustrated. In both
cases the real diminution of the debtor's estate occurs when the creditor is made
secure against other creditors, and that occurs within the four months period.x3
Creditors who rely on appearances while the mortgage is a secret lien will find
little solace in the fact that at the time the mortgage was executed the debtor
received "present consideration." Such "adequate value" does not reduce the
danger of injury from the secret lien. Indeed, since it adds to the estate, it
may increase the danger that credit may be given in reliance on the appear-
ances. Recording acts do not treat these two situations differently; the differ-
ence is recognized apart from the Bankruptcy Act, and it is difficult to see why
a distinction should be drawn for the purposes of the Chandler Act.
The technical difficulty in interpretation arises from the ambiguity of the
phrase "antecedent debt." What is the point of time with reference to which
it is to be judged whether the debt secured was or was not "antecedent"? The
words appear in the Bankruptcy Act for the first time with the Chandler Act
Amendments in 3938. Prior to that time, it was held that any recording "re-
lated back" to the time of original mortgage. In 1938 Congress reversed the
fiction and declared that a transfer shall be deemed to have been made at the
time when the security became "so far perfected" that no bona fide purchaser
or no creditor could obtain superior rights in the property. If a debt existed
before that time, it would seem that it is "antecedent" within the meaning of
the Act: antecedent in the sense of existing before the time at which the trans-
fer is deemed to have been made. Such an interpretation gives effect'to the in-
tent of Congress to strike down secret liens.'4 The interpretation should not, as
has been suggested, 5 invalidate transactions where recording follows promptly.
The Act may be interpreted to recognize as continuous a transaction lasting
12 For a criticism of the decision in the Adams case, see notes in 41 Col. L. Rev. 512 (1941);
36 Ill. L. Rev. 783 (i942); 29 Calif. L. Rev. 522 (i940.
'3 Even if the unperfected conveyance was made within the four months period, but record-
ed later, there may be reliance on the part of some creditor, and the doctrine of Moore v. Bay,
284 U.S. 4 (193r) (that a claim void as against some but not all the creditors of the bankrupt
may be avoided in toto by the trustee in bankruptcy, even though creditors generally benefit
by the avoidance) could be extended to protect all; Friedman v. Sterling Refrigerator Co.,
io4 F. (2d) 837 (C.C.A. 4th 1939); Corley v. Cozart, zii F. (2d) ug (C.C.A. 5th 294o); In re
Leven, 42 F. Supp. 484 (Md. i941).
X4 H.R. Rep. 24o9, at 30, 75 th Cong. Ist Sess. (i937); see also Weinstein, The Bankruptcy
Law of 1938 120 (1938); 3 Collier, Bankruptcy 6o.19-.29 ( 4 th ed. i941); 2 Glenn, Fraudu-
lent Conveyances §§ 480-90 (1940); McLaughlin, op. cit. supra note 3, at 392-93; Mulder,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 22-26.
15 Neuhoff, Assignment of Accounts Receivable as Affected by the Chandler Act, 34 Ill. L.
Rev. 538, 547 (1940).
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over a reasonably short period of time. As a practical matter, there is always an
interval of time between the execution of the security and its recording. The
problem of "continuous transactions" is not peculiar to the interpretation of
the Bankruptcy Act. 6
A recent case supports the arguments outlined above. Between January 19
and April 5, i94o, the Corn Exchange Bank made several loans to the Quaker
City Sheet Metal Company. On April 12, 194o, a Mr. Dearden also made a loan
to the same company. Concurrently with each loan and as collateral security
for it, the company assigned contracts and accounts receivable. On April i8,
I94O, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against the debtor com-
pany. Neither the bank nor Dearden gave notice of the assignments to the
account debtors, and the transactions occurred in a state where such notice is
necessary to protect the assignee against a bona fide purchaser of the account.
The court found that the security was never "so far perfected" and that the
transfer must therefore be deemed to have been made immediately before bank-
ruptcy. The court held that the time of the making of the transfer is the essen-
tial element in determining whether the debt secured was antecedent, and
that since the debt existed before the assignments were deemed made, within
the meaning of the Act, the transfers were "for or on account of an antecedent
debt" and constituted voidable preferences since the assignees knew of the
debtor's insolvency at that time.'
The court expressly rejected the reasoning in the Adams case.' s The short
time interval between assignment and bankruptcy presents the problem in its
most difficult setting. Had the assignments in the Quaker City case been made
a day or two after the loan, but not as a part of one continuous transaction, the
result reached would apparently not be questioned. This change of facts does
not appear to present a sufficient basis for distinction, since in both cases we are
concerned with striking down secret liens.
The decision of the court in the Quaker City case presents, in addition, prob-
lems peculiar to the assignment of accounts receivable. If the rule of the case
prevails, it may greatly restrict the use of accounts receivable as security. As-
signment of accounts is widespread, and is considered good business practice
x6 For examples of hardships of this kind that may arise, see Friedman v. Sterling Refrigera-
tor Co., 104 F. (2d) 837 (C.C.A. 4 th 1939); General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Coller,
io6 F. (2d) 584 (C.C.A. 6th z939), cert. den. 309 U.S. 682 (194o). The case of In re E. H.Webb,
32 F. Supp. 3 (Tenn. 194o), in which the transaction took place without the four months
period and the mortgage was recorded the next day which fell within the four months period, is
an example of the type of situation that should be explained as a "continuous transaction"
rather than on the basis used by the court. The case is criticized in 41 Col. L. Rev. 512, 5i6 n.
,9 (,94I).
17 In re Quaker City Sheet Metal Co., 129 F. (2d) 894 (C.C.A. 3d 1942). For another situa-
tion in which an assignment can fail to be "so far perfected" see In re Markert, 45 F. Supp. 66i
(Mass. 1942).
Note ii supra and accompanying text.
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by established lending agencies. Often such intangibles are the only type of
security left available, and it is feared that unfavorable decisions in bankruptcy
cases may discourage extension of credit.
Two general views are illustrated in the decisions regarding the validity as
against subsequent assignees of assignments of accounts receivable.19 The Su-
preme Court has held2o that of the two "equities," the prior in time prevails,
and that view is followed in a minority of the states.2 The English view, 2 fol-
lowed in other states, is that the assignee first giving notice to the account debt-
or prevails. In some states the choice between these views apparently turns
upon a number of circumstances. The court in the Quaker City case was in
Pennsylvania, a state which has adopted the English view. One writer has sug-
gested that the mere possibility of a second assignment which might render the
assignee's title imperfect is so remote a contingency that the possible "estoppel"
should not be held a qualification to his rights.23 It has been argued that he has
prima facie title, which should be regarded as "so far perfected ..... 124 The
same observation may be made, however, about an unrecorded mortgage, which
is perfectly valid between the parties, and which can be defeated only by fraud,
deceit, mistake-or bankruptcy. Congress in the Bankruptcy Act wrote a com-
prehensive definition of what constitutes a "transfer" which includes assign-
ments as well as mortgages and other liens.25
When bankruptcy intervenes after an assignment of accounts in a state fol-
lowing the rule that of two assignments the prior in time prevails, an interesting
problem is presented. There appear to be three exceptions to the prior-in-time
rule. If the second "equity" is "stronger," it will prevail. 6 This will occur
i) when the second assignee, acting in good faith, obtains payment of the claim
assigned; 2) when the second assignee reduces his claim to judgment in his own
name; or 3) when the second assignee effects a novation with the account debtor,
whereby the obligation in favor of the assignee is superseded by a new one run-
ning to himself. In case of bankruptcy after an assignment is made in a state
'9 Hamilton, The Effect of Section Sixty of the Bankruptcy Act upon Assignments of Ac-
counts Receivable, 26 Va. L. Rev. 168, 171-73 (1939).
20 Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1924).
21 Neuhoff, op. cit. supra note i5, at 538 n. 4.
22The leading case is Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. i (Ch. 1827), in which the second assignee in-
quired of the account debtor whether the account was assigned and hence could show actual
reliance. Courts have extended this doctrine in some jurisdictions to mean that the first as-
signee to give notice prevails, regardless of reliance.
23 Hamilton, op. cit. supra note zg, at 178.
'4 Hamilton, op. cit. supra note ig, at 186-87.
' 552 Stat. 842(30) (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 1(30) (Supp. 1942).
26 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 195, at 558-6o (1935); see Salem Trust Co. v. Manufac-
turers' Finance Co., 264 U.S. 182, 199 (1924).
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where such a rule prevails, can it be said that the assignment is "so far per-
fected" that no bona fide purchase and no creditor could have secured any
rights in the property superior to those of the first assignee, if he has not pro-
tected himself against these possibilities?
Answering this question in the negative does not, as has been suggested else-
where, "accomplish the abolition of the business of lending money on book ac-
counts. ' '27 The first assignee can protect himself.28 Notification to the account
debtor should be sufficient. If a second assignee then attempted to obtain pay-
ment, to effect a novation, or to obtain a judgment, he would normally be re-
sisted by the account debtor who merely would have to prove the first assign-
ment. If no resistance is given, one may suspect collusion between the second
assignee and the account debtor, in which event the second transaction would be
defeated as not bona fide. If, in addition, the first assignee takes additional pre-
cautions, insisting upon the stamping of the assigned accounts on the books of
the assignor, making the assignor the agent for collection and deposit only, pro-
viding for deposit in a special account not accessible to the assignor, and pro-
viding for segregation of goods returned, he will be able to protect himself in all
states.
29
This is not too much to ask. An outstanding assignment which is known only
to the assignor and the first assignee may mislead those who deal with the
assignor. The existence of a secret lien is not conducive to the informed bargains
which are essential to a healthy pursuit of enlightened self-interest. It is true
that the borrower may not want his customers to know that he is in a weak
condition, since they might hesitate to rely on his ability to perform his con-
tracts with them. It has been argued that to be useful such assignments must
be secret,30 else by the infinite routes through which business men obtain infor-
mation, the suspicion of general creditors will be aroused to the determent of
business. But notice will not result in undeniable curtailment of credit, nor will
it precipitate into premature bankruptcy the only temporarily embarrassed
debtor.3' Notice will not force a debtor into bankruptcy if an informed and dis-
27Hamilton, op. cit supra note i9, at 187.
28 This does not subject the assignee to too great a burden. However, the Bankruptcy Act
should be amended to except transactions, in conformity with the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act, as trust receipt transactions perfectly in accord with that Act will never become "so far
perfected" against a bona fide purchaser. Uniform Trust Receipts Act § 9(2)(a), 9 U.L.A. 662,
687 (1942); see note in 26 Cornell L. Q. 3o6 (1941).
29 Writers have suggested precautions which should be taken by assignees to prevent the
"unfettered use" of accounts receivable condemned as precluding the effective creation of a
lien in Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1925); Brinck, Accounts Receivable as Col-
lateral, ii Wash. L. Rev. 134 ( 936); Accounts Receivable as Collateral Security, 44 Yale L.J.
639, 648 et seq. (1935).
30 Accounts Receivable as Collateral Security, 44 Yale L.J. 639 (1935).
31 Voidability in Bankruptcy of Transfers Recorded within the Four Months Period, 44
Yale L.J. 109, 119 (i934).
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interested money market decides he may safely be permitted to stay in business.
It is suggested that banks and professional lenders using this security device
know the "moral and financial situation" of the debtor. 32 It has never been
demonstrated, however, that the sagacity and business judgment of the users
of this particular type of security is any better than that of other creditors, pro-
fessional or otherwise. The judgment concerning whether a business is to be
continued or not should be made by a well-informed and complete money mar-
ket, and not by a part of that market composed of holders of secret liens. An-
other argument presented by those who think "notice would be ruinous" 33 is
that accounts receivable are usually used to secure so-called "enabling" or
"rescue" loans. The creditor is said to take only part of what he put into the
estate during the last few months of insolvency, leaving others in the same posi-
tion as if he had never existed. This overlooks the possibility that the general
creditors may be in a worse position because of appearances of prosperity and
resultant further loans, forebearance, or postponed bankruptcy.
32 Neuhoff, op. cit. supra note 15, at 548.
33 Accounts Receivable as Collateral Security, 44 Yale LJ. 639 (1935).
